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A CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS IN
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
MakauMuTuA

INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the concept of transitional justice has come to represent
the midwife for a democratic, rule ofelaw state. 1 The script for the construction of
such a phase is now regarded as an indispensable building block for sound
constitutionalism, peace-building, and national reconciliation in post-conflict
societies or societies emerging out of abusive, authoritarian, and fractured
periods. 2 In fact, policy-makers and statesmen now increasingly realize that a
human rights state that internalizes human rights norms cannot be created
unless the political society concretely addresses the grievances of the past. There
is no future without a past, and the future is largely a result of the past. Unless we
construct a future based on the lessons of the past, we are bound to repeat our
own mistakes and retard the development of our society.
The term transitional justice captures two critical notions. First, it acknowledges
the temporary measures that must be taken to build confidence in the
construction of the post-despotic society. Secondly, by its own definition,
transitional justice rejects a winner-take-all approach as a beachhead to the
future. In other words, transitional justice calls for deep concessions on either
side of the divide. No one party or faction can be fully satisfied. Unyielding, none
concessionary demands can only foil the truce that is essential for national
reconstruction. But equally important is the realisation that transitional justice
rejects impunity for the most hideous offenders. To shield egregious perpetrators
would only encourage a culture of unaccountability for past abuses. Hence a

PRISCILLA HAYNER, Unspeakable Truths, Confronting State Terror and Atrocities, Routledge
New York, 1st ed. December 2000. A revised edition of this book has been recently published
in 2010.
DESMOND TUTU, No Future Without Forgiveness, First Image Book editions, New York, 1999.
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balance must be struck between justice for the victims and retribution against
offenders. 3
But the vast majority of states lack the requisite political will to effect
transformative transitions. That is why most political transitions are either still
born or aborted affairs. For Africa, this calls for soul-searching at all levels of
society - within the political class, among the intelligentsia, in civil society, and
the general public. In other words, Africans must ask themselves: Is transitional
justice a necessity for us if we are to create a democratic polity? If so, what
vehicles should we construct to effect transitional justice, and what mandate
shall we give such vehicles? But even as we ask these questions, we must remain
mindful about the cost of abandoning transitional justice measures. The reason
for this is simple: We cannot exorcise the ghosts of the past without confronting
them. The past will always be with us.
Even if we accept as a basic premise - which we do - that transitional justice
processes and institutions are desirable and indispensable, we would be derelict
not to interrogate the internal contradictions of the human rights project. I say
so because the human rights project, which encompasses transitional justice, is
an incomplete doctrine that is afflicted by gaping holes.4 International human
rights law, perhaps the most important transformational idea of our times, is
fraught with conceptual and cultural problems. Human rights norms seek to
impose an orthodoxy that would wipe out cultural milieus that are not consonant
with liberalism and Eurocentrism. While it is useful to develop international
standards for human rights, it is imperative that we understand the complexity
of the diversity of our world, and work to create doctrinally inclusive and
normatively multicultural formulae for dealing with human rights and social
justice. Otherwise, we will lose the liberatory potential of human rights and fail
to reconstruct societies that need recreation. While no society can truly emerge
from a legacy of conflict and violence without the implementation of serious
social justice measures, such an exercise cannot be carried out in a cultural
vacuum. For Africa, it is essential to recognize that communities and collectives
are an integral part of social reality. As such, the individualist focus of the human
rights corpus must be tempered with communalist or group-oriented approaches
if human rights prescriptions are going to enjoy any legitimacy on the
continent. 5
MARTHA Mrnow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide And
Mass Violence, Beacon Press, Boston, 1998.
MAK AU MUTUA, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, University of Pennsylvania
Press, Pennsylvania, 2002.
MAKAU MuTUA, "The Transformation of Africa. A Critique of the Rights Discourse", in
FELIPE G6MEZ lsA and KoEN DE FEYTER (eds.), International Human Rights Law in a Global
Context, Deusto University Press, Bilbao, 2009, pp. 899-924.
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The last fifty years represent the entire period of the African post-colonial state,
and gives us a fantastic window through to interrogate the performance of the
human rights project in Africa. But first, I want to lay aside some misconceptions
about the human rights corpus and the movement. At the outset, though, I want
to level with you about the subject of intellectual bias or normative location. Even
though objectivity is the name of our game, we are nevertheless products of our
legacies and heritages that have forged our identity and philosophical outlooks.
In that sense, true objectivity is an academic fiction, for no one could be truly
objective. In any case, if we were truly objective, we would be truly boring. And
so, I want to plead my biases at the outset. But I also want to warn you that with
respect to the subject at hand - that of the utility of human rights and liberalism
in Africa - I adopt the view of an insider-outsider, an engaged skeptic who
completely believes in human dignity, but is not sure about the typology of
political society that ought to be constructed to get us there.
I want to suggest that human rights are imprisoned in universality, one of the
central proclivities of liberalism. This fact alone should give us pause about
human rights because we ought to approach all claims of universality with
caution and trepidation. I say this because visions of universality and
predestination have often been intertwined throughout mo dern history. And
that intersection of universality and predestination has not always been a happy
one: with an alarming frequency, liberalism's key tenets have been deployed to
advance narrow, sectarian, hateful, and exclusionary practices and ideas. So, at
the purely theoretical level, we are chastised to look not once - but twice, and
again - at universalizing creeds, ideas, and phenomena. This is not to suggest
that universality is always wrongheaded, or even devious, although it has
frequently been those things as well - but it is rather to assume that the
universality of social phenomena is not a natural o ccurrence. Universality is
always constructed by an interest for a specific purpose, with a specific intent,
and a projected substantive outcome in mind.
This critical view has special implications for Africa because it questions both
the fit and utility of liberalism and human rights for the continent. If we agree
that all social truths are initially local - even truths about the so-called natural
attributes of human beings or the purposes of political society - what does that
say about the assumptions of liberalism in Africa? If social truths are contextual,
cultural, historical, and time-bound, how can one find the relevance of the
human rights project in Africa? This is not to say that local truths cannot be
transformed into universal truths. They can, but the question for students of
Africa is how one gets from here to there - in other words, what are the
limitations of liberalism in general, and human rights in particular, as
transnational projects? How do we turn local claims into universal human rights
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claims? If it is desirable to put liberalism in the service of Africa, how does one
do so?

1. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE AFRICAN REALITY
Assuming these basic philosophical difficulties, how can human rights as
conceived be of any help to the reconstruction and recovery of the African post
colonial state? Five decades after decolonization, the African state is still haunted
by crises of geographic, political, and moral legitimacy. It is beset by the
protracted reality of national incoherence and the ills of economic
underdevelopment. At its dawn, the African post-colonial state was handed a
virtually impossible task - assimilate the norms of the liberal tradition overnight
within the structures of the colonial state while at the same time building a
nation from disparate groups in a hostile international political economy.
Instead, the newly minted African post-colonial elites chose first to consolidate
their own political power. We can blame them now, as I have, but we must also
understand that the first instinct of the political class is to consolidate itself and
concentrate power in its own hands.
In the Cold War context, this frequently meant stifling dissent, dismantling
liberal constitutions, retreating to tribal loyalties or sycophantic cronies, and
husbanding state resources for corruption or patronage purposes, In other
words, any viable fabric of the post-colonial state started to crumble even before
it was established. We know the rest - coups and countercoups, military regimes,
and one-party dictatorships with the inevitable results of economic decay;
collapse of infrastructure; the fragmentation of political society; bilious
re-tribalization; religious, sectarian, and communal conflicts and civil wars; and
state collapse in a number of cases. The achievement of political independence
from colonial rule turned into false renaissance as one African after another
experienced transitional difficulties. While the African state retained some form
of international legitimacy, its domestic writ was wafer thin. It was a miracle that
many African states did not implode altogether given the challenges of internal
legitimacy. Whatever the case, the liberal tradition failed to take hold as human
rights were violated across the board.
However, the 1980s saw a resurgence of civil society and the re-emergence of the
political opposition. This started what has come to be loosely referred to as the
Second Liberation. The entire continent was rocked by a wave of political
liberalization not witnessed since the 1950s and 1960s. Virtually all states
succumbed to some political reform. In all cases, the civil society and the
political opposition sought a new social compact framed by the tenets of the
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liberal tradition. These were the rule of law, political democracy through
multipartyism, checks on executive power, limitations on the arbitrary use of
state power, judicial independence, directly elected and unencumbered
legislatures, separation of powers, freedoms of the press, speech, assembly, and
association - in a word, the whole gamut of civil and political rights or the full
complement of so-called basic human rights.
It was as though Africans were asking to go back to the liberal constitutions
imposed by the departing colonial powers. In some cases, new constitutional
orders were established to respond to these demands. But a decade a half after
the frenzy to reintroduce the liberal tradition to the politics of Africa, we cannot
count many blessings because the tumult of political liberalization has yielded
very mixed results. Optimists see a steady progression, even though the reversals
have been many and discouraging. Pessimists or what one might even want to
call realists, see an African state that is a stubborn predator, unable and unwilling
to accept reform. For every one step forward, there seems to be several steps
back. The near meltdown of Kenya in the aftermath of the December 2007 is only
one case in point. 6
Is the African state impervious to human rights and the liberal tradition, or is
the problem much more serious? The fault is variously placed on a bankrupt elite
or political class; structural impediments within the state - ethnicity, religious
zealotry, underdevelopment, the failure to establish a legitimate political order,
social cleavages; an unyielding international economic order. Whatever the case,
the jury on the current process of political liberalization, which is taking place at
the same time with economic globalization, is still out. It is still too early to say
for certain whether the African post-colonial state is out of the woods yet.

2. CAN HUMAN RIGHTS RECOVER THE AFRICAN
STATE?
The limitations that curtail the ability of the human rights corpus to respond to
Africa's crises are conceptual and normative. The first limitation is simply one of
the idiom in which the rights discourse is formulated. The language of rights,
which is central to liberalism, is fraught with limitations which could be
detrimental to the project of transforming deeply distorted societies. Inherent in
the language of rights are indeterminacy, elasticity, and the double-edged nature
of the rights discourse. All these characteristics open the rights language to
malleability, misuse by malignant social elements, and make them a tool in the
See in this respect MAKAU MuTuA, Kenya's Questfor Democracy. Taming Leviathan, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2008,
lntersentia
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hands of those opposed to reform. South Africa is a case in point where a right
based revolution has been unable to fundamentally transform deeply embedded
social dysfunction and the perverse legacy of Apartheid. The choice of the rights
idiom as the medium of choice to unravel the ravages of Apartheid has been less
than successful in spite of continued economic growth.
Another problem of the liberal tradition, which has been inherited by the human
rights movement, is its unrelenting focus on individualism. This arises from
liberalism's focus on formal equality and abstract autonomy. The human rights
corpus views the individual as the center of the moral universe, and therefore
denigrates communities, collectives, and group rights. This is one of the biggest
assumptions of the human rights movement. This is a particularly serious
problem in Africa where group and community rights are deeply embedded both
in the cultures of the peoples, and exacerbated by the multinational nature of the
post-colonial state. The concept of self-determination in Africa cannot simply be
understood as an external problem: it must, of necessity, be understood as
encompassing the many nations within a given post-colonial state. In reality, this
means that individual rights of citizens within the state must be addressed in the
context of group rights. Thus group rights or the rights of peoples become
important entitlements if the state is to gain the loyalties of its diverse citizens.
I do not deny that individualism is a necessity for any constitutional democracy,
but I reject the idea that we can, or should, stop there in Africa. That would be
stunted understanding of rights from an African point of view. Indeed, for rights
to make sense in the African context, one has to go beyond the individual and
address group identities in the political and economic framework of the state.
Even in South Africa, for example, one of the states with an avowedly liberal
interpretation of the rights language, there was an accommodation of group
rights to language, culture, and other forms of identity. One way political
democracy deals with the question of multiple nations within one state is to
grant autonomy regimes for groups or to devolve powers through forms of
federalism. But the paradox for Africa is that autonomy regimes or federalist
arrangements have not worked well wherever they have been tried. These
schemes have been unable to stem the combustible problem of ethnicity and
reduce the legitimacy of the state. Ethnic groups retain a consciousness that
stubbornly refuses to transfer loyalty from the group to the whole nation.
Secondly, the human rights movement's primary grounding and bias towards
civil and political rights - and the impotence and vagueness of economic, social,
and cultural rights - is one of its major weaknesses in the African post-colonial
context. Political democracy alone - without at least a strong welfare state or a
social democracy - appears to be insufficient to recover the African state. The
bias towards civil and political rights favors vested narrow class interests and
36
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kleptocracies which are entrenched in the bureaucratic, political, and business
sectors of society and represent interests that are not inclined to challenge the
economic powerlessness of the majority of post-colonial Africans. Yet the human
rights movement assumes the naturalness of the market and the inevitability of
employer/employee, capitalist/worker, and subordinated labor relations. It seeks
the regulation of these relationships, but not their fundamental reformulation.
By failing to interrogate and wrestle with economic and political philosophies
and systems, the human rights movement indirectly sanctions capitalism and
free markets. Importantly, the human rights corpus wrongly equates the
containment of state despotism with the achievement of human dignity so that it
seeks the construction of a political society in which political tyranny - not
economic tyranny - is circumscribed. But in so doing, it sidesteps economic
powerlessness - the very condition that must be addressed if the African state is
to be recovered. Clearly, political freedoms are important, but as South Africa
has demonstrated, these are of limited utility in the struggle to empower
populations and reduce the illegitimacy of the state. It is an illusion to think of
powerlessness and human indignity in the African context in purely political
terms, as the human rights movement does, and to prescribe political democracy
and the human rights doctrine as a panacea.
Real human powerlessness and indignity in Africa - the very causes of the
illegitimacy of the African state - arise from social and economic conditions.
That is why the human rights movement's recognition of secularism, capitalism,
and political democracy must be discussed openly to unveil its true identity so
that we can recalculate its uses, and the limitations of those uses, to the
reconstruction of the African state. To be useful to Africa's reconstruction,
human rights cannot simply be advocated as an unreformed Eurocentric
doctrine that must be gifted to native peoples. Nor can it be imposed on Africa
like an antibiotic, or be seen as a cure for the ills of a dark continent. I am afraid
that this is how many in the West imagine what for them is a human rights
crusade towards Africa. So far, this law and development model has not - and
will not - work. Not only is it an imposition, but it would also deal mostly with
symptoms, while leaving the underlying fundamentals untouched.
To be of utility to Africa, and fundamentally transform the continent's dire
fortunes, human rights must address economic powerlessness and the scandalous
international order. Otherwise, it will promise too much, while delivering too
little, as it did in the case of Rwanda with the establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal and a false peace within the country. It will promise too
much, while delivering too little, as it did in the wave of the so-called Second
Liberation. The challenge for us is to figure out how we can retool and rethink
the human rights project as one of the vehicles for the reconstruction of the
Intersentia

37

MakauMutua

African post-colonial state. I am afraid that this is a task for which we have been
found wanting.

3. RECONCEIVING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice concepts have to be freed from dogmatic universality to be
useful to Africa. In this regard, notions of transitional justice ought to be
reconstructed so that they are informed by a wider moral and social universe.
The key to a successful transitional justice agenda is to imagine a more holistic
approach to addressing human relationships in post-conflict, post-colonial
situations. Reparative, retributive, and adversarial notions of justice are limited,
and may not be wholly legitimate in the eyes of victims. Sanctions against
perpetrators - whether criminal, civil, or political - are important in any
transitional justice concept, but they are not enough. The problem is that such
sanctions are not at the core victim-centered. Criminal sanctions, for example,
are the revenge that society takes against the wrongdoer. Thus such sanctions
mollify society at large, but may do nothing for the victim. Civil sanctions, too,
such as compensatory damages respond to the material, and not the spiritual or
metaphysical. Thus although the victim may be returned to the status quo ante,
the restoration of material things may do nothing to heal the soul - the injured
identity of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, political opinion, or social status.
That is why I agree with Alex Boraine's 'holistic' approach to transitional justice
and the five-pillar approach that combines elements of accountability, truth
recovery, reconciliation, institutional reforms, and reparations in one grand
package of social reclamation? A wider array of tools and approaches are
necessary to address powerlessness in all its dimensions - social, economic,
political, gender to create a deeper democratic polity capable of repairing most
hurts. 8 It is these approaches that can ultimately tackle the hydra of impunity
that corrupts the body politic and makes it virtually impossible for society to
cohere into a nurturing instrumentality. That is why notions like ubuntu - the
African philosophy of community wholesomeness - must be conceived as a new
linchpin for the recovery of post-conflict societies. 9 This is not to say that
traditional iterations of transitional justice contained in international
humanitarian, human rights, and international criminal law are vacuous or
invalid. Rather, it is to recognize their limitations in addressing deeply embedded
ALEX BORAINE and SuE VALENTINE (eds.), Transitional Justice and Human Security,
Inter national Center for Transitional Justice, Cape Town, 2006.
KIERAN McEvoY and LORNA McGREGOR (eds.), Transitional justice from below. Grassroots
activism and the strugglefor change, Hart, Oxford, 2008.
YvoNNE MoKGORO, "Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa," in 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law
Review, 15, 1998.
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social dysfunctions that require more than criminal or civil sanction
approaches.
In fact, the histories of several highly touted traditional transitional justice
mechanisms point to these limitations. This is particularly true of international
criminal tribunals, and much less so of truth commissions. Take the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, for example. The !CTR followed the script of the Nuremberg
tribunal. But it is clear that as constituted, the Rwanda Tribunal was intended to
achieve neither the abolitionist impulses nor the just ends trumpeted by the
United Nations. The tribunal is still disarticulated from political reconstruction
and the normalization processes necessary to bring humanity back to Rwanda.
In the event, the Rwanda tribunal largely legitimizes the Tutsi regime and allows
the Tutsi a moral plane from which to exact their revenge on the Hutu. The
Rwanda tribunal would have made more sense in the context of a holistic and
comprehensive settlement addressing the foundational problems that unleashed
the genocide in the first place. As it is, the tribunal orbits in space, suspended
from political reality and removed from both the individual and national psyches
of the victims as well as the victors in the Rwanda conflict.10 The same analysis is
applicable to the ICTY where Serbs have seen themselves as its victims. The result
is a failure of both institutions to inch society towards healing.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has had more mixed, but arguably, promising
results because it was situated in the country itself, and not outside, as are the
cases with the both the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals. But the International
Criminal Tribunal for Iraq, though situated in Iraq, has been largely a sham from
both domestic and international perspectives. It lacks credibility with Sunnis
who see it merely as a tool for revenge by the Shiites and the occupying American
forces. Its unacceptably unfair, biased, and compromised procedures and the
absence of due process protections have made it a mockery of transitional justice.
It remains to be seen whether the International Criminal Court can address
some of these deficits, or remain simply as the darling of lawyers who see its
utility as developing international criminal and humanitarian law, or Western
politicians who see it as an instrument for assuaging their consciences for
societal failures about which they did nothing - or very little - to stop.
The key ultimately is to understand that none of these processes - truth
commissions, tribunals, sectoral reforms, prosecutions, and others - will suffice
by themselves unless they are thought about and implemented in a holistic
context that addresses the multiple, and often conflicting, vistas of
IO

See PHIL CLARK, The Garaca Courts. Genocide Justi ce and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice
without Lawyers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

Intersentia

39

MakaunMutua

powerlessness. 1 1 Here, building a democratic culture that is not just premised on
political rights, and tackling impunity, will be key to the society of the future. I
am not arguing that we should turn away from traditional systems of transitional
justice. Rather, I am arguing that these systems are incomplete and ineffective
because they do not focus on people and victims, but are rather concerned with
vindicating their own internal norms.

4. THE LIMITATIO NS O F TRANSITIO NA L J USTICE
CO NCEPTS
To be meaningful for Africa, transitional justice concepts should be
comprehensive and all-inclusive if they are to break with past orthodoxies. I want
to suggest a multi-cultural perspective in crafting effective solutions to legacies
of conflict. In this view, I am alluding to the limits of normative Eurocentrism in
the doctrine of international law. 12 While this critique of the exclusivity of
international legal norms is not new, it has not been fully developed in human
rights law and international humanitarian and criminal law. Yet these are
critiques are completely essential if transitional justice systems are to have any
hope of success in the tormented societies in Africa. Without a doubt, my
analysis demands is a tall order. The question is whether there is both intellectual
rigor on the part of academics and political will and vision on the part of states,
civil societies, and policymakers to carry through. These are questions which are
complicated by the histories of conflict and the memories they leave behind.
A survey of the anatomy of conflicts in the larger East African region - Kenya,
Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, and Burundi shows that democracy has not fared well.
As such, many of these states are undergoing different iterations of 'transitions'
from one thing or another. What is clear, however, is that these 'transitions' have
not accomplished much, and there indeed have been many reversals. Take, for
example, the near collapse of Kenya after the 2007 elections just five years
removed from the successful 2002 elections in which there was regime change
for the first time. Obviously, the 'transition' between 2002-2007 was not a
successful one.13 In Rwanda, Tutsi hegemony has once again been re-established
under the guise of 'democracy' and post-conflict transitional justice
'reconstruction'. Burundi remains tense. In Sudan, an unstable peace barely
holds in the south whereas in the west region of Darfur the government is
11
12

13
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PABLO DE GREIFF and ROGER DUTHIE (eds.), Transitional Justice and Development. Making
Connections, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2 009.
ANTONY ANGHIE, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2005; JAMES THUD GATHII, "Imperialism, C olonialism, and
International Law," 54 Buffalo Law Review 1013, 2006.
MAKAU MuTUA, Kenya's Questfor Democracy. . . , op. cit.
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committing genocide. How can you have a 'transition' in one part of the country
while committing genocide in the other? In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni
is creating the conditions for a perfect storm both in the north and everywhere
else because of political despotism and a failed transition to democracy.
My panacea here is a call to go beyond tired notions of transitional justice and
introduce fuller concepts of 'restorative justice' that move away from criminal
law formulations of sanctions, and instead employ alternative dispute resolution
paradigms such as indigenous courts, juvenile justice ideas, and other novel
vehicles that imagine the possibility of restoring a lost social balance. It is this
lost social balance which is the chasm that has caused the conflicts in the first
place. Some may attack this approach based on the localization of the practices
and norms, but I want to argue instead that dominant Eurocentric cultures suffer
from an over-emphasis of retribution, although they too have elements of
restorative justice. Virtually all cultures have restorative justice impulses in
them. But what is needed is the multiculturalization of transitional justice to give
it a truly universal imprint much in the same way that the human rights corpus
has been asked to become less Eurocentric and more inclusive. 14 There is some
hope as evidenced by the Ron Claassen's Principles of Restorative Justice15 and
by the UN Basic Principles on the use of Restorative Justice Programmes in
Criminal Matters16 that transitional justice must move beyond the punitive to
the more restorative, comprehensive, and holistic transitional justice model.
These principles are guided by their ability to heal; put victims at the center; seek
cooperation with perpetrators before confrontation; understand abominations
as injuries to social relations; de-emphasize the punitive or criminality of
offenses and emphasise the causes of the abominations; and achieve community
buy-in in crafting solutions and measures for accountability. In other words, this
transitional justice approach requires the full participation of all the assets of the
community - traditional, ethical, religious, civil society, political, and moral.
This is in marked contrast to traditional mechanisms such as truth commissions
or tribunals that look primarily to formalized structures of criminal
accountability and censure.
I believe that we have to re-imagine the transitional justice agenda along these
holistic perimeters, although I want to caution that this is an arduous project.
Secondly, it is important that the project not evacuate the progress made by
traditional transitional justice systems. For example, it is clear that truth
commissions have their naked limitations. Even the most famous ones - such as
14
15
16

MAKAU MUTUA, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, supra note 4.
"Principles of Restorative justice", The A lternative, Newsletter of the Dispute R esolution Center
of Snohomish and Island Counties, Washington, Spring 1 997.
ECOSOC, Resolution 2002/ 1 2, 24 July 200 2.
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South Africa's - have still left a lot to be desired. Most of them lack the political
backing or framework to dig at the roots of the abominations, or really expose
the rot that led to the pogroms in the first place. Most have been hampered by
the cultures of impunity in which they were incubated. After all, how do the
forces of reform - which are usually a minority in states emerging out of conflict
- marshal enough political resources to overcome former regime elements?
In Kenya, for instance, the Report of the Task Force for the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission which I produced was buried by
anti-reform elements in the Kibaki Government, even though it came to power
on a clear mandate fundamental change.17 Six years later, the same people who
shot down a truth commission are ostensibly interested in setting one up after
the genocidal violence of the 2007 elections. One has to wonder whether political
interests have changed so much as to permit a genuine truth commission to be
established in Kenya. Have Kenyans learnt any useful lessons between 2002 and
today that could be used to craft a more effective transitional justice project?
Evidence suggests that the pogroms of the election aftermath indicate a deeper
national psychosis that cannot be "cured" by a traditional truth commission or a
retributive justice system alone. The nature of the abuses that took place, the
proclivity of the political class to stoke ethnic hatreds, and the receptivity of the
populace to misogyny and other identity hatreds suggests that a holistic approach
to transitional justice is the only viable bridge to the future. The adoption of the
new Constitution in 2010 can be seen as an opportunity towards such
transformation. 18
We can employ dichotomy as a device to illustrate why traditional transitional
justice notions have experienced large deficits. In this device, we can imagine a
process de-dichotomization that is designed to free transitional justice from the
tyrannies of Eurocentric legal paganism. The point of departure here is that
dualism is a proclivity of Western liberal philosophy and the public imagination.
Thus good only makes sense in the face of evil, or right exists because of wrong.
This white over black, superior/inferior, modern/traditional, savage/victim,
progress/backward dualism has been an integral theme in European
civilization. 19 These dichotomies create illusions of moral certainty and policy
inflexibility. Given this fixity, it is no wonder that there is reluctance within
powerful countries and vested interests to entertain social, political, and legal
experimentation. This includes trials of emergent ideas in the area of transitional
justice. However, I want to suggest that we break these dichotomies down because
17
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it is self-defeating to create water-tight categories that artificially stop social
phenomena from naturally bleeding into each other. Whatever we do, it is not
productive to bifurcate for the sake of it, either because jurists think it is heresy
not to bifurcate, or politicians are afraid that holistic approaches will reach to
the bottom of the problem.
It is important to debunk one after the other of the many dichotomies of modern
Western civilization. For example, the modern/traditional schism imprisons us
in a false jail and makes it difficult for us to cultivate non-Western notions to
enrich transitional justice ideas. Another old-line distinction is between law and
politics, or the humanities. To traditional legal minds, law is supposed to be the
neutral arbiter of social conflict and the dispassionate source of the allocation of
power and its uses. Law is supposed to be impartial and objective whereas politics
is partisan and biased. The human rights movement was very good at insisting
on this dichotomy at the height of the Cold War for fear that it would be
delegitimized as a tool for the capitalist, liberal, and political democratic West. 20
These distinctions even found their way into the demonization of economic and
social rights as not rights at all in the way that political and civil rights are
conceived in liberal, market societies. This opposition was voiced at a meeting to
consider the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights:
'One participant felt strongly that it would be detrimental for US human rights NGOs
to espouse the idea of economic, social and cultural rights. Although they refer to
important issues, they concern distributive justice rather than corrective justice, like
civil and political rights. But distributive justice is a matter of policy, rather than
principles; and human rights NGOs must deal with principles, not policies.
Otherwise, their credibility will be damaged. Supporting economic demands will
only undermine the ability of NG Os to promote civil and political rights.'21

Attempts to locate political and civil rights in a different normative plane than
economic and social rights - while attentive to political biases have no scholarly
defense or argument simply because it is impossible to imagine a right in one
category that does not implicate a right in the other. As an analy tical question,
the distinction is purely fictional and has no bases in a normative argument. The
same is true of the distinction between law and politics or the humanities. For
the purposes of social transformation, such distinctions only serve to limit the
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potential of the transitional justice vehicles. 22 Thus international criminal law
needs to imagine itself as not in isolation from either geopolitics, or the national
political interests that animate and motivate political actors who will be subject
to transitional justice projects. Nor would it make much sense for retributive
justice processes to pay no attention to - or be separated from - the economic
and social needs of women victims, for instance. What kind of a lasting or
effective solution would only focus on criminal sanctions for perpetrators while
leaving completely unattended the moral and material needs of vulnerable
individuals and groups in society? Would that not simply leave intact the power
structures of yesterday and the fault lines that caused the pogroms in the first
place? If such an approach does not address powerlessness in all its multi
dimensions, how would it hope to deal with impunity? The integration of various
normative approaches that touch on the human condition is the only viable
method.
Other dualisms that vex transitional justice may include the use of criminal law
without examining what civil law measures might be added. One looks at social
wrongs as an affront on the individual while the other sees an offense as a wrong
committed against the public. The search for a national peace that is substantive
for individuals and communities cannot afford to put the two approaches at
logger-heads. Instead, both should be integrated in a wholesome process. The
same is obviously true of punitive, retributive processes common in adversarial
systems. An imaginative approach needs to go beyond punishment and
confrontation and craft hybrid systems that combine aspects of both depending
on the situation.
We can also identify the tension between national and international law as
another drawback. International law, that 'gentle civilizer' of nations, is not
meant to displace national or municipal law. 23 That is why international criminal
tribunals, for instance, are less useful if they are unconnected to transitional
processes taking place within states in the aftermath of conflicts. This critique is
especially applicable to both ICTR and the ICTY. But this dichotomy is extended
to how conflicts are treated - whether they are national or international conflicts.
So-called internal conflicts are less likely to draw international collective
responses unless they are perceived to be extremely serious, or to threaten the
strategic interests of the big powers. This is in spite of the fact that the impact of
the conflicts on individuals and groups is not diminished by the nature of it. The
dichotomy evacuates people from the center and replaces them with state
22

23

44

JAMES L. CAVALLARO and SEBASTIAN ALBUJA, "The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and
Truth Commissions in Latin America and beyond", in KIERAN McEvoY and
LORNA McGREGOR (eds.), Transitional justice from below . . . , op. cit., pp. 121-141.
MARTT! KoSKENNIEMI, The Gentle Civilizer of Nation: The Rise and Fall of International Law:
1870-1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
Intersentia

A Critique of Rights in Transitional Justice: The African Experience

interests. This is an additional hurdle that must be addressed by transitional
justice advocates.
One can identify a cluster of schisms of justice/peace, justice/reconciliation, and
justice/democracy. The assumptions here indicate that the demands of justice
would be incompatible with reconciliation, peace, or democracy. This one
dimensional thinking - where justice is understood as an end by itself - defeats
the logic of transitional justice. By the nature of the objectives of transitional
justice, it is not possible to have a winner-take-all approach. Peace requires
justice, but not full-throttled revenge. Reconciliation requires justice, but not in
an extreme bias against either victim or perpetrator. To redeem the perpetrator
without encouraging impunity requires a degree of conciliation on the part of
the victim. Finally, there is a false belief that national security can be attained
without human security. 24 Recent conflicts within countries - and between them
- have shown that neither is possible without the other. The cases of Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kenya, and even the United States amply demonstrate the folly of
treating one as separate from the other.

5.

AS A WAY OF CONCLUSION

The subject of transitional justice is a difficult and complex one, particularly
because it is a work in progress. Lessons from practice are still trickling in, and it
will be sometime before definitive data is accumulated. But one thing is clear we know what does not work, and what might work. What this chapter attempts
to do is provide an opening to reconceptualize transitional justice projects and
reformulate them from their traditionally narrow normative bases. Although it
seems obvious, there has not been adequate work done on the indivisibility of
the approaches to transitional justice. I am pleading for a more open mind to
collapsing - or at least resisting the reification - of traditional totems of analysis
and action. Human condition does not respond to abstracted categories. Rather,
its complexity and density require a nuanced understanding of what will
motivate individuals and groups to imagine a new and different life together.
How we think about the choices that have to be made to create a viable bridge to
that new society will depend on our ability to avoid intellectual rigidity and
policy myopia. But none of these will bear fruit unless political actors in Africa
imagine a larger vision for the continent.
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